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Abstract—Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been widely
applied in many autonomous systems such as autonomous driving
and robotics for their state-of-the-art, even human-competitive
accuracy in cognitive computing tasks. Recently, DNN testing
has been intensively studied to automatically generate adversarial
examples, which inject small-magnitude perturbations into inputs
to test DNNs under extreme situations. While existing testing
techniques prove to be effective, particularly for autonomous
driving, they mostly focus on generating digital adversarial
perturbations, e.g., changing image pixels, which may never
happen in physical world. Thus, there is a critical missing piece
in the literature on autonomous driving testing: understanding
and exploiting both digital and physical adversarial perturbation
generation for impacting steering decisions. In this paper, we
propose a systematic physical-world testing approach, namely
DeepBillboard, targeting at a quite common and practical driv-
ing scenario: drive-by billboards. DeepBillboard is capable of
generating a robust and resilient printable adversarial billboard
test, which works under dynamic changing driving conditions
including viewing angle, distance, and lighting. The objective is
to maximize the possibility, degree, and duration of the steering-
angle errors of an autonomous vehicle driving by our generated
billboard with adversarial perturbations. We have extensively
evaluated the efficacy and robustness of DeepBillboard through
conducting both experiments with digital perturbations and
physical-world case studies. The digital experimental results show
that DeepBillboard is effective for various steering models and
scenes. Furthermore, the physical case studies demonstrate that
DeepBillboard is sufficiently robust and resilient for generating
physical-world adversarial billboard tests for real-world driving
under various weather conditions, being able to mislead the
average steering angle error up to 26.44 degrees. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study demonstrating the
possibility of generating realistic and continuous physical-world
tests for practical autonomous driving systems; moreover, the
basic DeepBillboard approach can be directly generalized to a
variety of other physical entities/surfaces along the curbside, e.g.,
a graffiti painted on a wall.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are being widely applied
in many autonomous systems for their state-of-the-art, even
human-competitive accuracy in cognitive computing tasks.
One such domain is autonomous driving, where DNNs are
used to map the raw pixels from on-vehicle cameras to the
steering control decisions [1], [2]. Recent end-to-end learning
frameworks make it even possible for DNNs to learn to self-
steer from limited human driving datasets [3].
Unfortunately, the reliability and correctness of systems
adopting DNNs as part of their control pipeline have not
been formally guaranteed. In practice, such systems often
misbehave in unexpected or incorrect manners, particularly in
certain corner cases due to various reasons such as overfit-
ted/underfitted DNN models, biased training data, or incorrect
runtime parameters. Such misbehaviors may cause severe
consequences given the safety-critical nature of autonomous
driving. A recent example of tragedy is that an Uber self-
driving car struck and killed an Arizona pedestrian because
the autopilot system made an incorrect control decision that “it
didn’t need to react right away” when the victim was crossing
the road at night. Even worse, recent DNN testing research
has shown that DNNs are rather vulnerable to intentional
adversarial inputs with perturbations [4], [5], [6], [7], [8].
The root cause of adversarial inputs and how to systematically
generate such inputs are being studied in many recent DNN
testing works [9], [10], [9], [4], [11], [12], [13], [14]. While
these works propose various testing techniques that prove to be
effective, particularly for autonomous driving, they mainly fo-
cus on generating digital adversarial perturbations, which may
never happen in physical world. The only exception is a recent
set of works [9], [10], which take first step in printing robust
physical perturbations that lead to misclassification of static
physical objects (i.e., printouts in [15], human face in [10],
and stop sign in [9]). Our work seeks to further enhance
physical-world testing of autonomous driving by enhancing
test effectiveness during a realistic, continuous driving process.
Focusing on generating adversarial perturbations on any single
snapshot of any misclassified physical object is unlikely to
work in practice, as any real-world driving scenario may
encounter driving conditions (e.g., viewing angle/distance) that
are dramatically different from those in that static single-
snapshot view.
In this paper, we propose a systematic physical-world testing
approach, namely DeepBillboard, targeting at a quite common
and practical continuous driving scenario: an autonomous
vehicle drives by roadside billboards. DeepBillboard con-
tributes to the systematic generation of adversarial examples
for misleading steering angle when perturbations are added to
roadside billboards in either a digital or physical manner. Note
that the basic idea can also be directly generalized to a variety
of other physical entities/surfaces besides just billboards along
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Fig. 1: The top subfigure shows an example customizable
roadside billboard. The bottom two subfigures show an
adversarial billboard example, where the Dave [3] steering
model diverges under our proposed approach.
the roadside, e.g., a graffiti painted on a wall; in this work, we
choose the roadside billboards as our targeted physical driving
scenario for several practical considerations: (1) Billboards
are available to rent for advertising everywhere. Attackers
who rent billboards can customize their sizes and contents,
as illustrated in Fig. 1; (2) Billboards are usually considered
irrelevant or benign to the safety of transportation, and there
are no strict rules regulating the appearance of a billboard; (3)
Billboards are usually large enough to read by drivers and thus
dashcams for cars with different distances, viewing angles,
and light conditions; (4) An attacker may easily construct
a physical world billboard to affect the steering decision of
driving-by autonomous vehicles without others noticing, e.g.,
the actual core adversarial painting can only be a part of the
entire billboard while the other parts of the billboard can still
look normal, e.g., some bottom text bar showing “Art Museum
This Saturday”.
The objective of DeepBillboard is to generate a single
adversarial billboard image that may mislead the steering angle
of an autonomous vehicle upon every single frame captured by
onboard dashcam during the process of driving by a billboard.
To generate effective perturbations, a major challenge is to
cover a set of image frames exhibiting different conditions,
including distance to the billboard, viewing angle, and lighting.
Simply applying existing DNN testing techniques [12], [13],
[14] to generate digital perturbations upon any specific frame
clearly does not work in this case, because a realistic driving
scene may not incur any frame with same or similar conditions
(e.g., inserting sky black holes as done in the recent award-
winning DeepXplore work [12]). Besides, the effectiveness of
single frame perturbation may be not effective, since a mis-
steering upon a frame may be quickly corrected by the next
frame.
To resolve this critical challenge, we develop a robust
and resilient joint optimization algorithm, which generates a
printable billboard image with perturbations that may mislead
the steering angle upon every single frame captured by the
dashcam during the entire driving process. To maximize the
adversarial effectiveness, we develop various techniques to
minimize interferences among per-frame-perturbations, and
design the algorithm towards achieving global optimality con-
sidering all frames. Moreover, by inputting videos that record
the process of driving by a roadside billboard with different
driving patterns (e.g., driving speed and route), our algorithm
can be easily tuned to generate printable adversarial image
that is robust and resilient considering various physical world
constraints such as changing environmental conditions and
pixel printability due to printer hardware constraints.
Contributions. Considering such a real-world driving scenario
and developing a corresponding digital and physical adversar-
ial test generation method yield obvious advantages in terms
of test effectiveness: the possibility, degree, and duration of
misled steering decisions of any driving-by vehicles due to
the adversarial billboards can be reliably increased. Our key
contributions are summarized as follow.
1) We propose a novel angle of testing autonomous driv-
ing systems in the physical world that can be easily
deployed.
2) We introduce a robust joint optimization method to
systematically generate adversarial perturbations that
can be patched on roadside billboards both digitally and
physically to consistently mislead steering decisions of
an autonomous vehicle driving by the billboard with
different driving patterns.
3) We propose new evaluation metrics and methodology
to measure the test effectiveness of perturbations for
steering models in both digital and physical domains.
4) We prove the robustness and effectiveness of DeepBill-
board through conducting extensive experiments with
both digital perturbations and physical case studies.
The digital experimental results show that DeepBill-
board is effective for various steering models and scenes,
being able to mislead the average steering angle up
to 41.93 degree under various scenarios. The physical
case studies further demonstrate that DeepBillboard is
sufficiently robust and resilient for generating physical-
world adversarial billboard tests for real-world driving
under various weather conditions, being able to mislead
the average steering angle error from 4.86 up to 26.44
degree. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
study demonstrating the possibility of generating real-
istic and continuous physical-world tests for practical
autonomous driving scenarios.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
DNN in Autonomous Driving. An autonomous driving sys-
tem captures surrounding environmental data via multiple
sensors (e.g. camera, Radar, Lidar) as inputs, processes these
data with DNNs and outputs control decisions (e.g. steering).
In this paper, we mainly focus on the steering angle component
with camera inputs and steering angle outputs, as adopted in
NVIDIA Dave [3].
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), which is efficient at
analyzing visual imagery, is the most widely used DNN for
steering angle decisions. Similar to regular neural networks,
CNNs are composed of multiple layers and pass information
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through layers in a feed-forward way. Among all layers,
the convolutional layer is a key component in CNNs, which
performs convolution with kernels on the output of previous
layers and sends the feature maps to successor layers. Different
from another widely used DNN architecture – Recurrent
Neural Networks (RNNs) which is a kind of neural network
with feedback connections, CNN-based steering model makes
steering decisions based only on the currently captured image.
In this paper, we focus on the testing of CNN steering models
and leave RNN testing as future work. We nonetheless note
that DeepBillboard can be adapted to apply to RNN testing.
Intuitively, this can be achieved by modifying the gradient cal-
culation method according to RNN’s specific characteristics.
Digital Adversarial Examples. Recent research shows that
deep neural network classifier can be tested and further fooled
by adversarial examples [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. Such testing can
be performed in both black-box [16], [17] and white-box [4],
[5], [6], [7], [8] settings. Goodfellow et al. proposed the
fast gradient method that applies a first-order approximation
of the loss function to construct adversarial samples [18].
Optimization-based methods have also been proposed to create
adversarial perturbations for targeted attacks [4], [19]. Mean-
while, the recent DeepTest [13] and DeepRoad [14] techniques
transform original images to generate adversarial images via
simple affine/filter transformations or Generative Adversarial
Networks (GANs) [20]. Overall, these methods contribute to
understanding digital adversarial examples, and the generated
adversarial examples may never exist in reality (e.g., the rainy
driving scenes generated by DeepTest [13] and DeepRoad [14]
are still far from real-world scenes). By contrast, our work
examines physical perturbations on real objects (billboards)
under dynamic conditions such as changing distances and view
angles.
Physical Adversarial Examples. Kurakin et al. showed that
adversarial examples, when photoed by a smartphone camera,
can still lead to misclassification [5]. Athalye et al. introduced
an attacking algorithm to generate physical adversarial exam-
ples that are robust to a set of synthetic transformations [21].
They further created 3D-printed replicas of perturbed ob-
jects [21]. The main differences between aforementioned
works and our work include: (1) Previous works only use
a set of synthetic transformations during optimization, which
can miss subtle physical effects; while our work can sample
from both synthetic transformations and various real-world
physical conditions. (2) Our work modifies real-world true-
sized objects; and (3) Our work targets the testing of realistic
and continuous driving scenarios.
Sharif et al. presented dodging and impersonation attacks
for DNN-based face recognition systems by printing adver-
sarial perturbations on the eyeglasses frames [10]. Their work
demonstrated successful physical attacks in relatively stable
physical conditions with little variation in pose, distance/angle
from the camera, and lighting. This contributes an interesting
understanding of physical examples in stable environments.
However, environmental conditions can vary widely in general
and can contribute to reducing the effectiveness of pertur-
bations. Therefore, we choose the inherently unconstrained
environment of drive-by billboards classification. In our work,
we explicitly design our perturbations to be effective in the
presence of diverse and continuous physical-world conditions
(particularly, large distances/angles and resolution changes).
Lu et al. performed experiments with physical adversarial
examples of road sign images against detectors and show that
current detectors cannot be attacked [22]. Several more recent
works have demonstrated adversarial examples against detec-
tion/segmentation algorithms digitally [23], [24], [25]. The
most recent work for attacking autonomous driving systems
are the works conducted by Eykholt and Evtimov et al. They
showed that physical robust attacks can be constructed for road
signs classifiers [9], and such attacks can be further extended to
attack YOLO detectors [26]. Our work differs from such works
due to the fact that: (1) we target attacking steering models
by constructing printable perturbations on drive-by billboards,
which can be anywhere and have much more impacts than
road signs; (2) our proposed algorithm considers a sequence
of contiguous frames captured by dashcams with gradually
changing distances and viewing angles, and seeks to maximize
the possibility and the degree of misleading the steering angles
of an autonomous vehicle driving by our adversarial roadside
billboard; and (3) we introduce a new joint optimization
algorithm to efficiently generate such attacks both digitally
and physically.
III. GENERATING ADVERSARIAL BILLBOARDS
A. Adversarial Scenarios
The goal of DeepBillboard is to mislead the steering angle
of an autonomous vehicle, causing off-tracking from the
central of the lane by painting the adversarial perturbation on
the billboard alongside the road. Our targeted DNNs are CNN-
based steering models [3], [27], [28], [29], [30], without in-
volving detection/segmentation algorithms. The steering model
takes images captured by dashcam as inputs, and outputs
steering angle decisions.
We use off-tracking distance to measure the test effective-
ness (i.e., the strength of steering misleading), which has
been applied in Nvidia’s Dave [3] system to trigger human
interventions. Assume the vehicle’s speed is v m/s, the decision
frequency of using DNN inference is i second(s), the ground
truth steering angle is α , and the misleading steering angle is
α ′, then the off-tracking distance is calculated by v · i ·sin(α ′−
α). In potential physical world attack, the speed of the vehicle
usually are not controllable by the tester/attacker. Thus we use
steering angle error which is the steering angle divergence
between ground truth and misled steering to measure the test
effectiveness.
Instead of misleading the steering decision only at a fixed
distance and view angle, which may be hardly captured by a
driving-by vehicle, we consider the actual driving-by scenario.
Specifically, when a vehicle is driving towards the billboard,
we seek to generate a physical adversarial billboard that may
mislead the steering decision upon a sequence of dashcam-
captured frames viewing from different distances and angles.
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The number of captured frames clearly depends on the FPS
of the dashcam and the time used for the vehicle to drive
from the starting position till physically passing the billboard.
Considering such a real-world dynamic driving scenario yields
obvious advantage in terms of attacking strength: the possibil-
ity and the degree of misled steering decisions of any driving-
by vehicles due to the adversarial billboards can be reliably
increased. We emphasize that this consideration also funda-
mentally differentiate the algorithmic design of DeepBillboard
from applying simpler strategies such as random search,
average/max value-pooling, different order etc. Applying such
simpler methods would improve misleading angle for a single
frame yet lowering the overall objective. After a few iterations,
such methods hardly improve the objective.
B. Evaluating Matrices
Our evaluating metrics aim to reflect the attacking strength
and possibility. Vehicles may pass by our adversarial billboard
with different speeds and slightly different angles, which may
impact the number of image frames captured by the camera
and the billboard layout among different frames. Assume
Xˆ={x0, x1, x2, ... , xn} denotes an exhaustive set of image
frames possibly captured by a drive-by vehicle with any
driving pattern (e.g., driving speed and route), then frames
captured by any drive-by vehicle are clearly a subset X ⊆ Xˆ.
Our objective is to generate the physical printable billboard
which can affect (almost) every frame in Xˆ, such that any
subset X corresponding to a potential real-world driving sce-
nario may have a maximized chance to be affected. To meet
this objective, we define two evaluating metrics denoted M0,
M1 as follows.
M0 measures the mean angle error (MAE) for every frame
in Xˆ:
M0 = Avg
0<i<‖Xˆ‖
( f (x′i)− f (xi)), (1)
where f (·) denotes the prediction result of the targeted steering
model, x′ denotes the perturbed frame. This metric measures
the average strength of attacks to the frame super set. A larger
M0 intuitively would imply a higher chance and a larger error
of misleading the steering angle during the process of driving
by the billboard.
M1 measures the percentage of frames in Xˆ whose angle
error exceeds a predefined threshold, denoted by τ . τ can be
calculated based on the physical driving behavior. A formal
definition of M1 is given by:
M1 =
‖{xi| f (x′i)− f (xi)> τ,0 < i < ‖Xˆ‖}‖
‖Xˆ‖ . (2)
For example, if we want to mislead a 40MPH autonomous
vehicle by an off-track distance of one meter within a time
interval of 0.2 seconds,1 then τ can be calculated as 16.24
according to the above equation. We mainly adopt M1 as an
1We note that an autonomous vehicle would likely not run classification
on every frame due to performance constraints, but rather classify every j-th
frame, and then perform simple majority voting.
evaluating metric for our physical-world case studies, as M1
can clearly reflect the number of frames that incur unaccept-
able steering decisions (e.g., those that may cause accidents)
given any reasonable predefined threshold according to safety
stands in practice.
C. Challenges
Physical attacks on an object should be able to work
under changing conditions and remain effective at fooling
the classifier. We structure our discussion of these conditions
using our targeted billboard classification. A subset of these
conditions can also be applied to other types of physical
learning systems such as drones and robots.
Spatial Constraints. Existing adversarial algorithms mostly
focus on perturbing digital images and add adversarial per-
turbations to all parts of the image, including background
imagery (e.g., sky). However, for a physical billboard, the
attacker cannot manipulate the background imagery other than
the billboard area. Furthermore, the attacker cannot assume
that there exists a fixed background imagery as it will change
depending on the distance and viewing angle of the dashcam
of a drive-by vehicle.
Physical Limits on Imperceptibility. An attractive feature of
existing adversarial learning algorithms is that their perturba-
tions to a digital image are often small in magnitude such that
the perturbations are almost imperceptible to a casual observer.
However, when transferring such minimal perturbations to a
real world physical image, we must ensure that a camera
is able to perceive the perturbations. Therefore, there are
physical constraints on perturbation imperceptibility, which is
also dependent on the sensing hardware.
Environmental Conditions. The distance and angle of a
camera in a drive-by autonomous vehicle with respect to a
billboard may consistently vary. The captured frames that
are fed into a classifier are taken at different distances and
viewing angles. Therefore, any perturbation that an attacker
physically adds to a billboard must be able to survive under
such dynamics. Other impactful environmental factors include
changes in lighting/weather conditions and the presence of
debris on the camera or on the billboard.
Fabrication Error. To physically print out an image with all
constructed perturbations, all perturbation values must be valid
colors that can be printed in the real world. Furthermore, even
if a fabrication device, such as a printer, can produce certain
colors, there may exist certain pixel mismatching errors.
Context Sensitivity. Every frame in Xˆ must be perturbed con-
sidering its context in order to maximize the overall attacking
strength (maximizing M0 for instance). Each perturbed frame
can be mapped to a printable adversarial image with a certain
view angle and distance. Each standalone frame has its own
optimal perturbation. However, we need to consider all frames’
context to generate an ultimate single printable adversarial
image that is globally optimal w.r.t. all frames.
In order to physically attack deep learning classifiers, an
attacker should account for the above physical world con-
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straints, for otherwise the effectiveness of perturbations can
be significantly weakened.
D. The Design of DeepBillboard
We design DeepBillboard, which generates a single print-
able image that can be pasted on a roadside billboard by
analyzing given driving videos where vehicles drive by a
roadside billboard with different driving patterns, for contin-
uously misleading the steering angle decision of any drive-
by autonomous vehicle. DeepBillboard starts with generating
perturbations for every frame fi of a given video without
considering frame context and other physical conditions. We
then describe how to update the algorithm to resolve the
aforementioned physical world challenges. We finally describe
the algorithmic pseudocode of DeepBillboard in detail. We
note that it may not be practically possible to construct the
exhaustive set of image frames (i.e. Xˆ), possibly captured
by a drive-by vehicle with any driving pattern (e.g., driving
speed and route). Nonetheless, processing a larger number of
driving videos will clearly strengthen the testing effectiveness
of DeepBillboard due to a larger Xˆ, at the cost of increased
time complexity.
The single frame adversarial example generation searches
for a perturbation σ to be added to the input x such that the
perturbed input x′ = x+σ can be predicted by the targeted
DNN steering model f (·) as
max H( f (x+δ ),Ax),
where H is a chosen distance function and Ax is the ground
truth steering angle. To solve the above constrained optimiza-
tion problem, we reformulate it in the Lagrangian-relaxed form
similar to prior work [9], [10]:
argmin
δ
(−L( f (x+δ ),Ax)), (3)
where L is the loss function which measures the difference
between the model’s prediction and ground truth Ax. The
attacking scenario in this paper can be treated as inference
dodging which aims to not being correctly inferred.
Joint Loss Optimization. As discussed earlier, our objective
is to generate a single adversarial image that may mislead the
steering angle of an autonomous vehicle upon every single
frame the dashcam may capture during driving by the bill-
board. The appearance of the adversarial billboard may vary
when being viewed from different angles and distances. As a
result, to meet the objective, we need to generate one single
printable adversarial perturbation that can mislead every single
frame captured during the driving-by process. This is clearly
an optimization problem beyond a single image. It is thus
necessary to consider all frames jointly since one modification
on the billboard affects all frames. To this end, the problem
becomes finding a single perturbation ∆ that optimizes Eq. 3
for every image x in an image set X . We formalize this
perturbation generation as the following optimization problem.
argmin
∆
∑
0<i<‖X‖
(−L( f (xi+ pi(∆)),Ax)), (4)
where pi is the projection function of printable perturbation ∆
into every single frame i.
Handling Overlapped Perturbations. Every single frame
may generate a set of perturbations which is composed of
multiple pixels to be updated on the ultimate printable adver-
sarial image. Perturbations of multiple frames may encounter
overlapped pixels, which may produce interferences among
those frames. To maximize the attacking strength, DeepBill-
board seeks to minimize the overlapped perturbations among
multiple frames by only updating a fixed number of k pixels
for each single frame in order. The k pixels are those that
have the most impact on misleading the steering decision.
We assume the final adversarial billboard image covering n
dashcam-captured frames is composed of m pixels. k is a
value satisfying n · k < m, which helps reduce the overall
chance of perturbation overlapping among frames. For each
overlapped pixel, we update it by greedily choosing a value
that maximizes the objective metric (e.g., M0).
Enhancing Perturbation Printability. For the perturbation
to work in the physical world, each perturbed pixel needs to
be a printable value by existing printer hardware. Let P ⊂
[0,1]3 be the set of printable RGB triples. We define non-
printability score (NPS) of a pixel to reflect the maximum
distance between this pixel and any pixel in P. A larger NPS
value would imply a smaller chance of accurately printing out
the corresponding pixel. Our algorithm thus seeks to minimize
NPS as part of the optimization. We define the NPS of a pixel
p′ as:
NPS(p′) =∏
p∈P
|p′− p|. (5)
We generalize the definition of NPS of a perturbation as the
sum of NPS values of all the pixels in this perturbation.
Adjust Color Difference under Various Environment Con-
ditions. For different environmental conditions, the observable
color of the same pixel belonging to the billboard image
may look different in the video captured by a dashcam. Such
difference may impact the adversarial efficacy under different
conditions. In our physical world experiments, we pre-fill the
entire billboard with unicolor p = {r,g,b}. Under a specific
environment condition e, its actual color shown in camera
may become p′ = {r′,g′,b′}. Based on our experiments, we
observe that such color differences of pixels in the same image
are almost the same. To simplify the problem, we introduce a
color adjustment function ADJi = di(p, p′) for each image xi
to adjust the color difference.
Algorithm overview. The procedure of DeepBillboard for
generating an adversarial billboard image is illustrated in
Fig. 2. To generate an adversarial billboard image, we first
pre-fill the billboard with unicolor, and paint its four corners
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Fig. 2: Work flow of DeepBillboard to generate adversarial perturbations for contiguous frames.
Algorithm 1 Generating attacks for maximizing M0
Require: IMGS . List of images of the same scene
Require: COORD . List of coordinates of billboards in IMGS
Require: ITER . Number of enhance iterations
Require: BSZ . Number of images in a batch
Require: ADJ . List of adjustment for environment factors
Require: DIM . Dimensions of printable perturbation
1: function GENERATE
2: perturb = COLOR INIT(DIM)
3: pert data = zero(BSZ, DIM)
4: for i in ITER do
5: random.shuffle(IMGS)
6: for j in range(0,len(IMGS), BSZ) do
7: batch = IMGS[j, j+BSZ]
8: pert data.clear()
9: for x in batch do
10: grad = ∂ob j/∂x
11: grad = DOMAIN CONSTRNTS(grad)
12: pert data[x] = REV PROJ(grad, ADJ)
13: pert data = HANDLE OVERLAP(pert data)
14: atmpt pert = pert data · s + perturb
15: atmpt pert = NPS CTL(atmp per, ADJ)
16: atmpt imgs := UPDATE IMGS(atmpt pert, COORD)
17: this diff = CALC DIFF(atmp imgs)
18: if this diff > last diff or rand() < SA then
19: perturb = APPLY(perturb)
20: imgs := UPDATE IMGS(perturb, COORD)
21: last diff = this diff
22: return perturb
with contrasting colors for the purpose of (1) locating the
coordinates of the billboard digitally, and (2) getting the
color adjustment function ADJi. Then we record video using
dashcam and drive by the billboard with different driving
behaviors (e.g., different driving speeds and driving patterns)
along the road. Then we send the pre-recorded videos to our
algorithm as inputs to generate the printable adversarial bill-
board image. As discussed earlier, inputting a larger number of
driving videos will clearly strengthen the testing effectiveness
of DeepBillboard, at the cost of increased time complexity.
The pseudocode of our adversarial algorithm is illustrated
in Alg. 1. Our algorithm is essentially iteration-based. In each
iteration, we first obtain perturbation proposals for a batch of
randomly chosen images according to their gradients which
reflect the influence of every pixel to the final objective. We
then greedily apply only those proposed perturbations that may
lead to better adversarial effect. We apply a sufficient number
of iterations to maximize steering angle divergence and the
perturbation robustness.
As seen at the beginning of Alg. 1, the inputs include: a
list of frames in the pre-recorded videos, a list of coordinates
of the four corners in the billboard in every frame, number
of enhancing iterations, batch size, a list of color adjustment
factors, and the dimension of targeted digital perturbation.
As illustrated in Alg. 1, perturb is a printable perturbation
matrix that is composed of RGB pixel values (line 2). We
use COLOR INIT to pre-fill the printable perturbation matrix
with one unicolor c∈ {0|255}3. Based on our extensive digital
and physical experiments, using unicolor-prefilled matrix may
result in better results and faster convergence. According to
our experiments, gold, blue, and green are the most efficient
unicolors for our testing purposes. pert data is a list of
matrices which store the proposed perturbations for a batch of
images (line 2). Lines 4 to 21 loop through enhanced iterations
which aim to maximize the adversarial effectiveness and the
perturbation robustness. At line 5, we randomly shuffle the
processing order of captured frames. The purpose is to avoid
quick convergence to a non-optimal point at early video frames
(similar to deep neural network training). Starting from line
6, we loop over all the images which are split into batches.
For each image batch, we initialize and clear pert data (lines
7-8) before looping over every single image inside the batch
(line 9).
For each image x within a batch, we calculate its gradient
which is the partial derivative [18] of object function to input
image (line 10). By iteratively changing x using gradient
ascent, the object function can be easily maximized. We note
that we can intentionally mislead targeted steering model to
steer left or right by selecting positive or negative value of
gradient. We then apply domain constraints to the gradient
(line 11) to ensure that we only update the pixels belonging
to the corresponding area of the billboard, and the pixel values
after gradient ascent are within a certain range (e.g., 0 to
255). In the implementation, as discussed earlier, we introduce
a parameter k to only apply top k gradient values that have
the most impact on adversarial efficacy. This is to reduce the
overlapped perturbations among all images. Different from
the saliency map used in JSMA [31] which represents the
confidence score of x being classified into targeted class for the
current image, we consider the influence to the joint objective
function for all images in this scene, seeking to maximize
the average steering angle difference from ground truth. After
constraining the applicable gradients, we project the gradient
6
TABLE I: Studied scenes for digital experiments.
Scenes Img Size BB min BB max
Dave-straight1 54 455×256 21×22 41×49
Dave-curve1 34 455×256 29×32 51×49
Udacity-straight1 22 640×480 48×29 66×35
Udacity-curve1 80 640×480 51×51 155×156
Kitti-straight1 20 455×1392 56×74 121×162
Kitti-straight2 21 455×1392 80×46 247×100
Kitti-curve1 21 455×1392 64×74 173×223
values for each image x to the proposed perturbations of
the batched images (line 12). ADJ (i.e., the input list of
adjustments for environment factors) is used to correct color
difference for different lighting conditions. For example, if
a pure yellow color (255,255,0) becomes (200,200,0), then
ADJ is set to be (55,55,0). When projected to the physical
billboard, the gradient value should be increased by (55,55,0).
After all images in the batch get their gradients, there may
exist overlapped perturbations among them. That is, for each
pixel corresponding to overlapped perturbations, it may have
multiple proposed update values for the ultimate printable
adversarial example. To handle such overlaps (line 13), we
implemented three methods: (1) update the overlapped pixels
with the max gradient value among proposed perturbations,
(2) update the overlapped pixels with the sum of all gradient
values, and (3) update the overlapped pixels with one of the
proposed values that has the greatest overall influence to the
objective function. Then at line 14, we calculate the proposed
update atmpt pert by adding gradients to the current physical
perturbation perturb. After color corrections and non-printable
score control (line 15), the proposed perturbations for the
physical billboard are projected to the images according to
the coordinates (line 16). We calculate the total steering angle
difference for perturbed images (line 17). If the proposed
perturbations can improve the objective, or meet the simulated
annealing [32], indicated by SA. we accept the proposed
perturbations (line 19) and update all images with these
perturbations (line 20). Then we record the current iteration’s
total steering angle divergence and use it as the starting point in
the next iteration. When all enhanced iterations are finished,
we return the physical perturbation perturb as the resultant
output. We note that, although our major goal is to generate
physical perturbations, the output can be directly patched to
digital images as well.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the efficacy of DeepBill-
board both digitally and physically for various steering models
and road scenes.
A. Experiment Setup
Datasets and Steering Models. We use four pre-trained
popular CNNs as targeted steering models, which have
been widely used in autonomous driving testing [14], [13],
[12], [11]. Specifically, we test three models based on the
DAVE self-driving car architecture from NVIDIA, denoted
as Dave V1 [33], Dave V2 [27], Dave V3 [28], and the
Epoch model [29] from the Udacity challenge [34]. Specif-
ically, Dave V1 is the original CNN architecture presented
in NVIDIA’s Dave system [3]. Dave V2 [27] is a variation
of Dave V1 which normalizes the randomly initialized net-
work weights and removes the first batch normalization layer.
Dave V3 [28] is another publicly available steering model
which modifies the original Dave model by removing two
convolution layers and one fully connected layer, and inserting
two dropout layers among the three fully connected layers.
As the pre-trained Epoch weights are not publicly available,
we train it following the instructions provided by the cor-
responding authors using the Udacity self-driving Challenge
dataset [34].
The datasets used in our experiments include: (1) Udacity
self-driving car challenge dataset [34] which contains 101,396
training images captured by a dashboard mounted camera
of a driving car and the simultaneous steering wheel angle
applied by the human driver for each image; (2) Dave testing
dataset [35] which contains 45,568 images recorded by a
GitHub user to test the NVIDIA Dave model; and (3) Kitti [36]
dataset which contains 14,999 images from six different scenes
captured by a VW Passat station wagon equipped with four
video cameras.
The dataset used for our physical case studies consists
of videos recorded by a tachograph mounted behind the
windshield of a driving car for driving by a pre-placed
roadside billboard on campus. We use aforementioned pre-
trained steering models to predict every frame, and use the
resultant steering angle decisions as the ground truth.
Experiment Design. Based on our discussion from Sec-
tion III-B, we evaluate the efficacy of our algorithm by
measuring the Average Angle Errors of all frames in a scene,
both digitally and physically.
For digital tests, our scene selection criteria is that the
billboard should appear entirely in the first frame with more
than 400 pixels and partially disappear in the last frame. We
then randomly select seven scenes that satisfy this criteria
from aforementioned datasets, and evaluate on all the selected
scenes. The selected scenes in each dataset cover both straight
and curved lane scenarios. Since all these datasets do not
contain coordinates of billboards, we have to label the four
corners of billboards in every frame of the selected scenes. To
make the labeling process semi-automated, we use the motion
tracker functionality of Adobe After Effects [37] to automat-
ically track the movement of billboard’s four corners among
consecutive frames. We then perform necessary adjustments
for certain frames whose coordinates are not accurate enough.
We list the statistics about all the studied scenes in Table I,
where the first column lists the names of scenes, the second
column shows the number of images in every scene, the third
to fifth columns indicate the resolutions of images and the
min/max sizes of billboards in each scene. In digital tests,
there is no color adjustment under different environmental
conditions. The final adversarial example is patched into every
frame according to the projection function. Then we use the
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Fig. 3: Steering angle error variations along the timeline
steering models to predict the patched images and compare
them against the ground-truth steering decisions recorded in
the given datasets.
Our compared baseline is the inference steering angle for
each given trained model. Our approach seeks to maximize
the distance from the baseline, regardless whether baseline is
ground truth or inference results. We choose to present results
associated with using inference as the baseline because the
driving datasets used in experiments may not have ground
truth steering angle. Since there exists many physically-correct
driving behaviors, we use statistical methods (i.e., average,
percentage) to test the effectiveness during the entire driving
segment rather than within each individual frame.
For physical tests, we record multiple videos using a tacho-
graph mounted on a vehicle at various realistic driving speeds.
We place a billboard alongside the road, and drive towards
the billboard straightly along the central of the road. We start
recording at approximately 100 ft away from the billboard,
and stop recording once the vehicle passes the billboard. We
perform multiple physical tests under three different weather
conditions including sunny, cloudy, and dusk weather. The
physical test is composed of the following two phases:
• (1) Phase I: We use a white billboard with its four corners
painted as black and then use a golden billboard with four
blue corners. For each board, we record and drive along
the central of the road with a slow speed of 10mph in
order to capture sufficient frames (i.e., training videos).
• (2) Phase II: We send the input videos to our testing
algorithm to automatically generate the adversarial per-
turbation, which will then be pasted on the billboard. We
then drive by the adversarial billboard with normal speed
at 20 mph and record the video (i.e., testing video). We
calculate the average angle error compared to the ground
truth steering angle for every frame of the video.
We note that strictly speaking, a real-world test would in-
volve actually autonomous vehicles driving by the billboard to
observe the adversarial impact. Unfortunately, due to lacking
actualy autonomous vehicles, to validate DeepBillboard in
real-world settings, we took a similar approach applied in the
following state-of-the-art autonomous-driving research [12],
[13], [14], which also has not involved actual autonomous
vehicles in the evaluation. Specifically, we take videos with
different driving patterns as inputs, which can be as exhaustive
as possible to cover all potential viewing angles at different
vehicle-to-billboard distances. In the physical-world evalua-
tion, we tried to pre-record as many abnormally-driving videos
as possible to cover a majority of the possible misled driving
scenarios of an actual autonomous vehicle. Such videos have
been applied in the adversarial construction/training phase.
We show such an abnormally-driving video in the following
link: https://github.com/evilbillboard/EvilBillboard. This video
shows that DeepBillboard is able to continuously deviate a
car within each frame. This would mimic one of the many
actual autonomous driving scenarios where the vehicle is
continuously misled by DeepBillboard at each frame (i.e., the
misled angle within each frame is similar to the one shown in
this video).
B. Digital Perturbation Results
The results of digital perturbations are shown in Table II,
where each column represents a specific scene, and each
row represents a specific steering model. Every image in
a cell shows a representative frame that has the median
steering angle divergence. For example, the image in cell
(Dave V1, Udacity Scene1) represent the image in Udacity
dataset Scene1 has the Average Angle Error among all frames
in the same scene when predicted by Dave V1 steering model.
Two arrows shows the steering angle decision divergence in
each image, where the blue one is the ground truth and the red
one is the steering angle of the generated adversarial exam-
ples. We observe that in all scenes, DeepBillboard makes all
steering models generate observable average steering angle di-
vergences. Specifically, DeepBillboard misleads the Dave V1
model by more than 10◦ in 6 out of 7 scenes, except for
9
Kitti Straight1 in which the billboard occupies a small space.
Dave V2 incurs the largest average divergence – more than
16.7◦ among all scenes. The test cases of Dave V2 model
show that even with underfitted model, DeepBillboard can still
greedily enlarge such divergence. DeepBillboard causes the
smallest divergence for the Dave V3 model – 0.44◦−25.01◦.
The reason is because Dave V3 introduces three dropout
layers between four fully connected layer, and use augmented
training data, which both contribute to the enhanced robust-
ness and generalization of the trained model. Particularly,
the adoption of dropout layer which randomly deactivates
half of the neurons, can cause part of the perturbations on
billboards being deactivated, thus reducing the efficacy of
adversarial perturbations. We note that the Epoch model also
adopts dropout layers, so its average angle error is also small
compared to Dave V1 and Dave V2 in all scenes. However,
Epoch does not apply the training data augmentation used
by Dave V3 which crops the images to train only the road
pavement, thus the perturbations on the roadside billboard
has more influence to the prediction compared to Dave V3,
resulting in a larger average angle error.
We further show the results on steering angle error along the
timeline for each studied scene, from the first frame to the last
frame where the billboard size increases monotonically among
these frames. The results are shown in Fig. 3, where each sub-
figure indicates a specific scene, the x-axis is the indexes of
images along the timeline, and the y-axis is the steering angle
error (◦). We observe that in most scenes the steering angle
errors increase when the billboard size increases, as indicated
by the Dave V1 lines shown in Fig. 3 (d), (e), (f), (g). The
reason behind is intuitive – larger billboards in images may
activate stronger perturbations. On the contrary, certain lines
do not follow this trend, as indicated by Fig. 3 (a), (b), (c). For
example, in Fig. 3 (b), frames in the middle contribute more
steering angle errors for the Dave V1 model. We learn that
in such scenarios, even though the billboard is quite small in
the image, it can still lead to large steering angle divergence
when applying adversarial perturbations, indicating the test
effectiveness and robustness of DeepBillboard.
C. Parameter Tuning
In this set of experiments, we show that how parameter
tuning may affect the AAE–average angle error. Fig. 4 shows
the convergence trend when applying different parameters.
The x-axis is the enhanced iteration, y-axis is AAE, and the
lines represent different parameter settings. For example, line y
indicates that the iterations begin with initializing the billboard
as yellow, y(5) indicates setting the batch size as 5. Similar
settings apply to y(10), and g indicates an initialized green
billboard. Line y(10,sum) indicates that besides using batch
size 10, it also uses sum to update gradient, instead of the
default max pooling. We observe from Fig. 4(a) that starting
iterations from yellow is overall better than starting from green
in this example. Additionally, we observe that two lines behave
much better than other lines – y(5, max) and y(10, sum).
To further explore the tradeoff of batch size and sum/max
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Fig. 4: Convergence of AAE w.r.t different parameters.
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Fig. 5: Converge over iterations with different parameter
tunings: (a) first 40 frames; (b) 40 frames in the middle;
(c) interleaving half frames; (d) all frames.
method, we conduct another set of experiments which iterate
up to 1000 iterations, whose results are shown in Fig. 4(b). We
observe that, two lines representing y(5,max) and y(10,sum)
outperform the other two lines. What we learn from these
two figures are: (1) carefully choosing the initial color of the
billboard can efficiently increase the converge speed and yield
a better results; and (2) there is no clear indications showing
there exists a better parameter choice between choosing a large
or small batch, and choosing max or sum to update gradient.
To figure out how the training set affects the convergence
and the objective, we use the same initial color, batch size and
overlapping handling (y(5,max)) for different subsets among
the total 80 frames in Udacity Curve1. The results are shown
in Fig. 5, where four sub-figures represent (a) the first 40
frames, (b) the last 40 frames, (c) the 40 frames with even
indexes, and (d) all 80 frames, respectively. Lines in each
sub-figure represent different k values to be updated. We
observe that all lines ascend fast at early iterations, and the
increase rates drop after around 400 iterations. The lines in
Fig. 5 (a) converge to a lower AAE compared to lines in the
other three sub-figures. Lines using the last 40 frames clearly
achieve better results. From this observation, we learn that the
chosen training set does affect the final objective in the sense
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that images with larger billboards can achieve better results.
Additionally, a larger k value usually achieves better results
and faster convergence in most scenarios except for Fig. 5
(a). The reason is that in this specific scenario, the billboard
occupies a rather small number of pixels. Thus, aggressively
increasing the number of updated pixels would cause severe
interferences among frames, thus leading to lower AAE. From
the parameter tuning experiments, we learn that choosing
images with larger billboard space, aggressively updating more
pixels, would result in faster convergence and better results.
D. Physical Case Study
As described in Section IV-A, our physical case study is
composed of two phases. Specifically, for both training and
testing videos, we start recording at 100 ft far away and stop
recording when the vehicle physically passes the billboard.
The driving speed is set to be 10mph for training videos in
order to capture sufficient images, and the speed for the testing
video is 20mph to reflect ordinary on-campus driving. We
perform our physical tests on a straight lane without curves
under three different weather conditions including sunny,
cloudy, and dusk weather. To make the training robust, we
record three training videos through three slightly different
routes: central, left-shifting, and right-shifting. The billboard
used in our experiment has a size of 6′×4′. We adopt Dave V 1
as the steering model.
We define Exp AAE to indicate the expected average angle
error according to the training videos, which is the M0 metric
defined in Section III-B based on digital perturbations. We
use Test AAE to indicate the actual average angle error for all
images in the testing video, which is the M0 metric defined in
Section III-B for physical perturbations. We also record the
M1 metric defined in Section III-B for the test video. We set the
steering angle error threshold to 19.8◦ since when the driving
speed is 20mph, such mis-steering would cause at least an
off-track distance of one meter within a time interval of 0.33
second (duration of 10 frames for a 30 FPS camera), which
is large enough for causing dangerous driving behaviors as
demonstrated by NVIDIA Dave [3].
We note that our chosen evaluation metrics using average
angle error and percentage of large angle error can reasonably
reflect the overall possibility and strength of misleading for
consecutive frames. In the physical experiment, we calculate
the angle error threshold according to the speed, which can
cause at least one-meter off-tracking (defined as dangerous
driving behaviors by NVIDIA Dave2).
The visible results are shown in Table III, where each row
shows a sunny scene of a testing video, including one video
with empty billboard and two videos with adversarial bill-
boards. The second column shows the printable perturbations.
Columns 3-6 present different distances between the vehicle
and the billboard. We observe that, with white billboard, the
steering angles are almost straight in all distances. With the
first (bright) adversarial billboard, the steering angles turn
left to a certain degree; on the contrary, the second (dark)
-40
-30
-20
-10
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120
An
gl
e 
Er
ro
r
Frame Index
Ad_left Ad_right
Fig. 6: Per-frame steering angle error.
adversarial billboard leads steering to the right. As mentioned
in Sec. III-D, this is controlled by setting gradient flag(+/-).
The values of test effectiveness are shown in Table IV,
where three rows show our experiments under three weath-
er/lighting conditions – sunny, cloudy, and dusk weather. The
values in this table reflect steering angle compared to the
baseline steering without perturbation. Under each condition,
the table shows the three aforementioned metrics for two
adversarial settings (i.e., left-misleading (right-misleading) de-
noted by the “Ad left” (“Ad right”) column). We observe
that two adversarial perturbations both yield relatively large
Exp AAE (denoted by “Exp” in the table) and Test AAE
(denoted by “Test”) for all weather conditions. For instance,
under the Sunny condition, DeepBillboard yields a left mis-
leading steering angle of 8.88 degree. In many cases, the
Test AAE value is only slightly smaller than Exp AAE,
indicating DeepBillboard’s effectiveness in the physical world
setting. Furthermore, the percentage of frames that have a mis-
steering angle larger than the pre-defined threshold (i.e., the
M1 metric) is more than 19% in most scenarios (4 out of 6)
and can even reach up to 100%. Overall, we detected 268
frames out of the total 900 frames that exhibit a mis-steering
angle larger than the threshold, implying dangerous driving
behaviors within these frames.
To better interpret the results, we also report the per-frame
steering angle for the physical tests under the Sunny condition
in Fig. 6 (due to space constraints, we omit the other two
scenarios which show similar result trends), where the x-
axis represents the frame index, and the y-axis represents the
steering angle. We note again that a positive (negative) steering
angle value indicates a left (right) steering. The two curves
indicated in this figure represent the testings of applying two
adversarial billboards (left-misleading and right-misleading).
We observe that, the left-misleading test successfully causes
the angle errors larger than zero, and the right-misleading
test successfully causes the angle errors smaller than zero.
This trend become mores observable at later frames, since the
billboard becomes larger in each frame.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose DeepBillboard, a systematic
physical-world testing of autonomous driving systems. Deep-
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TABLE IV: Test effectiveness of physical case study
Cond. Ad left Ad rightExp Test M1 Exp Test M1
Sunny 23.34 8.88 32% -20.09 -15.49 19%
Dusk 42.27 26.44 100% -26.54 -8.45 0
Cloudy 9.66 4.86 0 -20.4 -11.37 26%
Billboard develops Robust Joint Optimization to systemati-
cally generate adversarial perturbation that can be patched on
roadside billboards both digitally and physically to consis-
tently cause mis-steering in a scene of multiple frames with
different viewing distances and angles. Extensive experiment
results demonstrate the efficacy of DeepBillboard in testing
various steering models in various digital and physical-world
scenarios. Furthermore, the basic DeepBillboard approach
can be directly generalized to a variety of other physical
entities/surfaces besides billboards along the curbside, e.g., a
graffiti painted on a wall.
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